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We have been clueless over the fact that why did
SRK [Bollywood superstar Shahrukh Khan] choose
to write his son AbRam’s name in such a different
manner and here’s what the actor has explained.
‘His name is based on a variation of Prophet
Abraham. And I liked the connotation that it’s…a
secular name. We are a Hindu-Muslim family… and
I want my children to grow up without any
difference of opinion in the name. It’s nice this
way and has more universal appeal’ [...] Shahrukh
Khan already has two kids with wife Gauri Khan.
His son named Aryan Khan is 15 years old, while
his daughter Suhana is 12 years old.
(Filmibeat, 21 August 2013)
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In [Martin Amis’s] book, Experience, he describes
asking his father what it’s like to be anti-Semitic:
‘If I’m watching the end of some new arts
programme I might notice the Jewish names in the
credits and think, Ah, there’s another one. Or: Oh I
see. There’s another one,’ Amis Sr. replies.
(The Guardian, 7 November 2014)
 
Introduction: anti-algorithm
1 It is a truism that a person’s name is liable to convey a good deal of information about
them. Conventional rules tied to the names ‘Gurpreet’ and ‘Muhammad’ ensure that when
someone  sees  or  hears  those  names,  they  will  probably  assume  that  they  designate
individuals from, respectively, Sikh and Muslim backgrounds. Personal names, indeed,
come with considerable demographic baggage (Alter 2013: 13), frequently acting as key
vehicles for the automatic categorization of their bearers and the noticing of the category
before the person (as  seen in the quote from the Guardian newspaper  in one of  the
epigraphs above).
2 This is as true in South Asia as it is elsewhere where ‘the two (or more) names of an
individual are expected to reflect without ambiguity, the gender, caste and religion of
that individual’ (Banerjee 2008: xiv). The assumption of a correlation between personal
name  and  caste  and/or  religion  has  led  to  a  variety  of  attempts  to  harness  the
information conveyed in South Asian names for governmental and biopolitical ends that
for some will contain echoes of the colonial project of ‘control by classification’ (Ingold
2011: 174).  Consider  the  development  by  UK  epidemiologists  of  name-recognition
algorithms to identify not only British South Asians but the regional, linguistic and ethnic
subgroups within this larger category—the stated purpose being to supplement existing
datasets used in research on ethnic variations in health with more accurate information
on subjects’ ethnicity (Cummins et al. 1999, Nanchahal et al. 2001). Most recently, political
anthropologist Raphael Susewind (2014) has explored the potential of an open-source
algorithm’s  use  of  local  name  registers  in  Uttar  Pradesh  to  provide  ‘probabilistic
inference  of  religious  community.’  The  explicit  aim is  to  provide  insights  into,  and
ameliorative  policies  in  respect  of,  group-based  inequality.  Since  (again)  adequate
datasets on religious communities do not exist, the algorithm is seen to ‘provide […] a
workaround  by  probabilistically  exploiting  the  communal  connotations  of  names;  it
transforms name lists—which are readily available—into a new source of demographic
data’ (Susewind 2014: 1).
3 It is important to be clear that the algorithms referred to are not, and could never be,
100% accurate,  and to  be  fair  no  one  is  proposing  they ever  could  be.  As  Susewind
(2014: 3) is careful to point out, names do not ineludibly reflect religious background or
ethnicity (see also Stewart 2000: 51). Quite apart from boundary-crossing names such as
those used by the north Indian Meo community (e.g. Ram Khan, Shankar Khan), which are
irreducible  to  the  religious  either/or  that  such  algorithms  demand  (not  unlike  the
colonial state’s requirement of binary legibility), surname-titles such as ‘Chaudhary’ may
belong to a  Hindu,  Muslim or another community besides,  and a variety of  ‘neutral’
obfuscators exist, such as Kumar and Singh, that usually are not caste-specific,1 while a
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caste surname that strongly signifies a particular community in one region of the country
is liable to signify a different one elsewhere (e.g. Nayak).
4 Nevertheless, and putting to one side for the moment ethical questions raised by such
endeavours,  the  logic  informing  the  algorithms  remains  powerful—personal  names
usually do provide telling insights into the community backgrounds of their bearers, and
answers to the everyday question ‘What is your name?’ are perpetually fed into a kind of
social algorithm for the calculation of identity, in a corridor, on a train, in a store, on the
phone, or wherever. But what if  South Asian names ceased to be capable of providing such
‘data’—and  in  fact  served  to  scramble  any  attempt  at  automatic  categorization? It  is  that
question that this essay explores. There are of course numerous ways in which persons
convey  demographic  baggage  other  than  through their  names—‘some information  is
always evident in face-to-face interaction, because we are all ambulatory autobiographies
continuously  and  unavoidably  emitting  data  for  others’  senses  and  machines’  (Marx
1999: 101)—but as Goffman (1963: 76) pointed out, of all the markers of identity personal
names are perhaps ‘the easiest to tamper with.’
5 The essay is grounded in on-going ethnographic work amongst committed proponents of
secularism in India,  namely rationalist,  humanist,  and atheist organisations and their
members,2 but it also explores allied attempts to ‘secularise’ names made by people and
institutions that would not identify as rationalist but certainly would describe themselves
as secular. What I call ‘secular names’ are, by and large, names that have been ‘tampered
with’ through acts of renaming to downplay or extinguish demographic (i.e. caste and
religious)  markers  that  at  the  same  time  are  also,  of  course,  markers  of  belonging.
Renaming, here, may refer to an activist’s self-renaming, or to the naming of his or her
child in ways that do not accord with convention. M.N. Srinivas’s (2012: 335–6) use of the
term ‘secular names’ is similar but different to mine. He employed it to refer to a move
amongst Karnataka’s urban elites away from naming children after deities. Yet among the
examples he gives are Ashok, Sanjay and Ravi, names which, because of their Sanskrit
origin,  continue to  encode their  bearers’  Hindu backgrounds,  regardless  of  their  not
being the names of Hindu gods. In some cases, amongst secular activists, this is where
their attempts to employ a secular name end. However, I  include in my definition of
secular naming practices more radical  and diverse attempts to onomastically cloak a
person’s religious and/or caste background, as we shall see.
6 Some secular names carry an explicitly pedagogical message, part of their purpose being
to encourage reflection upon their own nature and, via that, a person on their worldview.
Names that withhold the information usually associated with them, in calling attention to
themselves, may provoke reflection on the arbitrariness, changeability, and role of names
in forming the very community distinctions they signify. That is not to say they always
succeed in this, but rather to suggest that this is where some users of such names locate
the value in them. I  shall  thus employ the term ‘meta-name’ to call  attention to the
pedagogy of the name in certain instances of secular onomastic experimentation.
7 I  identify two main strategies used by activists for the production of ‘secular names’:
purification of the caste and religious connotations of names, and multiplication of those
connotations in the giving of boundary-crossing names. At certain points the strategies
overlap; but I see heuristic value in retaining the distinction for the time being. Common
to each is a rationale that seeks to break the association between name and pigeonholed
identity, an association that it is important to recognise is itself the product of diverse
procedures by which group boundaries were solidified both by their interactions with the
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state  and  with  various  kinds  of  reform  movements,  caste  associations,  and  other
mechanisms  for  removing  any  ambiguity  with  regard  to  the  straightforward
identification of name with the social group (see Das & Copeman this issue, Steinberg this
issue). We might say that if prior deeds of purification operated according to a logic of
either/or, the two strategies pursued by activists operate according to logics of, one the
one hand, both/and (boundary-crossing names), and on the other, neither/nor (purified
names). The two strategies demonstrate the extent to which naming has become subject
to experimentation amongst rationalists and secular activists. Though I do not claim that
all  or  even a  majority  of  activists  engage  in  such onomastic  experimentation,  every
rationalist is able to point to examples from within their circle of activism, and there are
rationalist  associations  where  naming  innovations  are  absolutely  normal  and  indeed
required.  For  Punjab’s  dynamic  and  influential  Tarksheel  organisation,  for  instance,
dropping one’s caste surname is a condition of membership.
8 Before turning to the specific strategies employed, it is important first to be clear about
why they are experimenting thus. I suggest there are three principal reasons. First, they
take up a position that sees the inescapable associations and automatic categorization of
personal  names  as  leading  directly  to  the  circumscription  of  human  possibility.  For
Bourdieu  (1991: 121),  names  ‘inaugurate  the  actor’s  identity  and  inform  him  in  an
authoritative manner of what he is and what he must be,’ and this can equally describe
the rationalists’ view. Rationalist activists seek to circumvent the ought self imposed on a
person by their name; to liberate themselves and others from its shackles. Second, there
is the matter of demonstrating consistency. Anti-caste activism is folded into the Indian
rationalist  worldview.  Famous  for  their  anti-superstition  and  miracle  demonstration
campaigns, activists frequently describe caste as the biggest superstition of all. Retention
of a caste surname leaves activists open to charges of hypocrisy, similar to the recent
accusations levelled at Arundhati Roy who, after the publication of her new introduction
to B.R. Ambedkar’s The Annihilation of Caste,  was challenged on her continued use of a
caste surname.
9 Third,  and  most  important,  is  activists’  acute  recognition  of  the  role  of  names  in
facilitating multiple forms of discrimination.  The by now classic study by economists
Bertrand  and  Mullainathan  (2004),  which  revealed  the  dramatic  extent  to  which
employers in Boston and Chicago discriminate against equally qualified candidates based
solely on whether their names are typically ‘white’ or ‘black,’ was recently replicated for
a variety of Indian metropolitan contexts to revealing effect. Thorat and Attewell’s (2010)
study entailed responding to private sector job adverts with CVs demonstrating equal
qualifications,  but with names indicative of a number of different caste and religious
backgrounds.  While  the  finding  that  applicants  with  discernibly  Dalit,  low  caste  or
Muslim-sounding names were far less likely than those with high caste ones to hear back
from employers will probably surprise few social scientists, the research is valuable for
vividly crystallising the socio-economic stakes of personal names in the region, and for
providing a compelling counter to illusory rhetoric that celebrates the supposed ‘post-
caste’  egalitarianism of the liberalised economy. The demographic baggage of  names,
then, plays a key role in everyday discrimination, from the notorious difficulties faced by
people with low-caste or Islamic names in finding properties for rent, to obtaining jobs,
and so on.
10 Activists’ onomastic experiments are thus addressed to a specific set of problems. In his
reflections  on  Dewey  and  Foucault’s  differing  approaches  to  problems  as  a  topic  of
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enquiry, Rabinow (2006: 42–3) notes that the former’s emphasis is on identification and
rectification  of  problems,  while  the  latter’s  ‘problematisation’  is  oriented  towards
understanding  how  different  responses  to  a  problem  are  ‘simultaneously  possible.’
Elements of both perspectives inhere in activists’ strategies and in my account of them.
With  Dewey,  activists  seek  to  ‘clarify  and  realign  a problematic  situation’  (Rabinow
2006: 42). With Foucault I seek to understand the problematic dissonances between the
different attempts made to realign the problem, and how addressing the problem can
create a set of new ones. Thus, while the first part of the paper identifies the differing
onomastic  strategies  employed  by  activists  to  attend  to  the  problem  of  names  and
automatic categorization, the latter sections show how the proffered solutions constitute
themselves another field of problems. Acts of renaming, and non-normative names as
such,  can be  and are  contested.  Performative  utterances,  if  they  are  not  enacted  in
ordinary circumstances but, for instance, on the stage, out of earshot, or in a language the
hearer does not understand, will be simply ‘hollow or void’ (Austin 1962: 22), and secular
naming practices by their very nature are extraordinary—this is how they gain their
power but it also leaves them open to being ignored, ridiculed or classed as illegitimate,
especially by those who would police community boundaries.  As an archetypal Status
Function Declaration—an act that makes something the case by representing it as being
the case—naming is a function that can be performed ‘only in virtue of the fact that there
is a recognised status of the object or the person that performs the function’ (Searle
2015: 145), and it is just such a status that may be lacking in cases of secular (re)naming,
as  we shall  see.  Such a focus on debates  and criticisms both within and outside the
movement  about  the  worth  and  validity  of  particular  naming  strategies  is  key  for
clarifying what is at stake in the domain of secular naming practices.
 
Prior innovations
11 It is important to be clear that present-day secularists are far from being the first or only
individuals to identify the name as a problem or to mark it  as an explicit  matter of
concern  and  questioning.3 What  we  might  call  ‘transcategorial  onomastics’ 4—an
onomastics to dethrone the algorithm, so to speak—is both varied and longstanding, from
Guru Gobind Singh’s hailing of three Shudras, a Brahmin and a Kshatriya as ‘Singhs’5 in
forming the Sikh khalsa (Cunningham 1849: 70), to present-day deaf Indians’ disavowal of
caste  or  religious  monikers  in  favour  of  ones  denoting  a  particular  bodily  feature
(Friedner n.d.;  cf. Steinberg this  issue),  from the use of  generics  such as  ‘Kumar’ 6 to
characters in twentieth-century Hindi novels going by single names only as a means of
facilitating identification with them whatever the reader’s background [Gold 2015]), and
similarly the preponderance of characters in Hindi film who have been ‘surnameless and
thus regionless, casteless, ethnically non-identifiable, and [in Nandy’s opinion at least]
ultimately ahistorical’ (Nandy cited in Charkavarty 1993: 200).
12 Yet such alleged ahistoricism I would suggest is very historically situated indeed—it is no
coincidence that the surnameless characters in Hindi fiction and films are coeval with an
era of patriotic nation-building in which caste and religious differences were downplayed
in many circumstances in favour of pan-Indian generics.  This could take the form of
suppression of caste identifiers as in the case of the maternal uncle of a middle-aged
teacher friend of mine in Delhi who, a communist party member, had in the 1960s given
up the caste surname Gupta and adopted Bharti (Indian) ‘because he wanted a casteless
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society,’ or of nationalist boundary-crossing names as in the famous case of revolutionary
fighter Udham Singh who, when arrested for the murder of Michael O’Dwyer, who had
been lieutenant-governor of the Punjab in 1919 when the Jalianwala Bagh massacre took
place, gave the boundary-crossing nationalist name Ram Mohammad Singh Azad, ‘a name
that invoked the three major religious communities of the Punjab—Hindu, Muslim, and
Sikh—as well as his anticolonial sentiment (azad means “free”)’ (Mir 2010: 2–3).
13 In present times, Dalit migrants to the city may, for obvious reasons, take the opportunity
migration affords to discard surnames that are often stigmatising (see Paik 2011: 236,
Pandey 2013)—a  practice  that  remains  controversial  both  within  and  outside  Dalit
communities.7 Though many Dalits actively retain stigmatising caste surnames as acts of
assertion  and  positive  revaluation,  Dalit  and  rationalist  naming  practices  frequently
overlap, sharing what might be termed a commitment to confusion. A north Delhi-based
Dalit activist who uses a single name only—leaving a question mark where the usual caste
title surname would be—put it to me like this: through naming practices such as his there
will be ‘So, so much confusion. Then the whole thing [that is, caste discrimination] will go
away.’ The expression he used was the Urdu ‘ghaflat ho gayi.’  Though in the following
quotation—from  a  Christian  Dalit  acquaintance  who  retains  his  Christian  forename
having changed his surname to a perfectly ambiguous Hindu one that connotes different
castes  in  different  regions—the  Hindi  expression  used  was  bhram:  ‘Some think  I  am
Brahmin, some Kshatriya, some OBC, some Hindu, and those who know me know I am a
Christian. It is good to confuse people. The upper castes have been befooling (bevakuf bana
rahe hain) SCs for centuries, so if they are confused by the new Shuklas and Sharmas [i.e.
Dalits taking on upper caste names] that is good’ (emphasis added).
14 The intentional production of categorical uncertainty by way of experimental onomastics
is thus not the preserve of rationalist activists. Much more could be said on the matter of
a wider transcategorial onomastics not specific to rationalist activists, and its class basis—
for instance, the kind of boundary-crossing names employed by upwardly mobile urban
parents  that  signifies  their  sophisticated  cosmopolitanism.  The  glossy  Mumbai-based
Mother and Baby magazine presents interviews with ‘society’ figures who do exactly this—
Muslim actors whose new-born babies bear Hindu or Christian names and vice versa—and
its founder-editor Priya Pathiyan told me about Hindu Sindhi friends of hers who live in
south Delhi whose new-born they named Zyaan: global citizens, ‘they are comfortable
giving their baby a name that has roots in Arabic, ignoring older family members who ask
“why a Muslim name?”’8 Contemporary secular naming practices sometimes reflect both
this class dimension (many—though certainly not all—activists belong to ‘respectable’
professions such as medicine and academia) and that of nationalism—for instance, the
son of a Punjabi rationalist leader is named Vishav Bharti (World Indian), and I shall
describe similar instances of boundary-crossing names to that of Udham Singh below—
which begs the question: are their naming acts mere remnants of a waning Nehruvian-era
nationalist identity (i.e. a kind of onomastic ‘national integration’)? Is there anything vital
or ‘contemporary’ about them or are such names teetering objects of nostalgia—without
import in the so-called ‘new India’?
15 The question becomes more pressing still  in light of the way in which the politics of
unrecognition, or reverse identity politics, I am concerned with here would seem quite at
odds with the post Indian nationalist tendency toward differentiation as identified in a
plethora of influential works from V.S. Naipaul’s A Million Mutinies Now (1990) to Jaffrelot’s
The  Silent  Revolution  (2003).  The  latter  work charts  the  rise  of  caste-based  political
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formations in the country consequent on the years preceding the 1975–77 Emergency
when  the  Congress’s  populist  goals  ‘had  come  to  be  expressed  in  terms  which  […]
signalled the importance of jati and varna [i.e. caste] classifications to anyone who could
be  thought  of  as  wronged  or  deprived’  (Bayly  1999: 285,  see  also  Kapila 2008).  My
suggestion is that it is precisely because the dominant analytical narrative has focused on
heightenings of difference that we should take seriously secular naming innovations as
containing the possibility  of  delineating a  countervailing trend towards  more broad-
based national  or  non-particularising  identities—a trend that  risks  neglect  given the
existing  scholarly  emphasis  on  differentiated  particularities.  It  is  not  just  that  a
transcategorial imaginary still exists, but that it is evolving in new and interesting ways
and onomastics are at its heart.
16 There  is  a  further  reason  we  should  pay  attention  here.  Activists’  rationalism  is
frequently dismissed as ‘the basis of hypocritical scorn for the less well educated and
their  superstitions’  (Feuchtwang 2013: 86),  with activists themselves  accused of  being
nothing other than Macauley’s grandchildren (a stance shared by the Hindu right and
many scholars [Quack 2012b]). The material presented here allows us to progress beyond
such stereotypes. The colonial regime—whose mantle activists are said to have inherited
—famously inaugurated the governmentalisation of difference with massive continuing
ramifications  to  this  day,  and scholars  have  been active  in  pointing  out  the  role  of
enumeration in formalizing what had previously been ‘fuzzy’ communities (Kaviraj 1989)
and how the competition between these newly identifiable interest groups resulted in a
direct and singular equation between enumeration on the one hand and reification and
fissiparity  on the other.  The reverse identity  politics  of  ‘Macauley’s  grandchildren’  is
therefore  of  note.  In  their  politics  of  unrecognition  we  might  discern  an  onomastic
method of hope (Miyazaki 2004),  or prefigurative (Graeber 2002) politics of  the name.
Omvedt, in 2010, wrote movingly of ‘Waiting for an India when caste names will have lost
their meaning’: ‘Perhaps [such] names might remain—after all, the US and England have
Smiths, Carpenters, Potters—but in India, as there, no one would remember that they
mean anything.’  The  activists  discussed here  refuse to  wait.  Seeking  to  produce  the
transcategorial in specific local instances,  activists prefigure and foreshadow a future
they simultaneously help to bring into being—a prefigurative politics of the name.
 
Strategy 1
17 The first strategy I term purificatory. It seeks to remove caste and religious connotations
from the names activists themselves bear or that they give to their children. Omvedt
(2010), as just noted, hopes that the caste connotations of many Indian surnames will be
forgotten and become what Jullian (cited in Wilson 1998) in 1919 called ‘sterilized words.’
Activists,  however,  seek to  accelerate  the  process  of  onomastic  sterilization through
active removal of such connotations.
18 Given their anti-caste convictions it is unsurprising that the removal of caste surnames is
a common practice amongst them. Sometimes, as was mentioned earlier, dropping a caste
surname is a condition of membership of local rationalist organizations. Activists may
dispense with a surname altogether, use their place of origin as a (toponymic) surname,
or adopt a ‘place-holder’ name such as Kumar or Singh. The founder of Tarksheel, the
main Punjab rationalist society, changed his surname from Mittal, a caste title, to Mitter,
meaning friend, a technique that retains an aural memory of the disavowed, ideologically
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unsound name (see Paik [2011: 236] on Dalit versions of this onomastic move and Mehta
[this issue] on the spectrality of proper names).
19 Krishnan,  an  activist  from central  India,  insisted  to  me that  ‘We  should  not  expose
religion in [our children’s] names… Though I am from a Hindu background, I am not a
Hindu—only  a  human  being.  My  wife,  who  is  also  an  activist,  is  from  a  Christian
background, but she is not a Christian. We thought about it carefully and we called our
elder son Lyric, and our younger son is called Sonnet.’
20 The use of English words as names allows parents to avoid an association with Sanskrit-
derived names, for even if a Sanskrit name has no explicit religious reference point (e.g.
unlike, for instance, the father’s name Krishnan), the Hindu background of a person may
be gauged by its Sanskrit  origin (as with,  for instance,  Akash [sky]—not an explicitly
‘religious’ name but nonetheless typically revealing its bearer to be Hindu, or perhaps
Jain or Sikh). This is similar to the situation of Muslims in Tamil Nadu: it is not that they
do not see themselves as Tamils yet the association between Tamil and Hinduism causes
them to choose non-Tamil names (Britto 1986). The drawback of this strategy, for secular-
rationalist  activists,  is  that  it  is  at  odds with their  attempts to emphasise that  their
project is one deeply embedded in Indian history as a counter to the Hindu right (and
indeed scholarly) charge that they are inheritors of the colonial mantle. However, if the
words are themselves ‘un-Indian,’ use of the related words Lyric and Sonnet does reflect
the not uncommon north Indian practice of naming siblings in poetically similar ways, as
in, for instance, calling three brothers Rachin, Sachin and Nitin.
21 Families associated with Vijayawada’s Atheist Centre,9 provide further examples of the
method of onomastic purification. This is what its literature has to say about rationalist
naming practices:
Birth of a child, irrespective of gender, is a happy occasion for atheists and they
share joy  with  others.  They  name  their  children  as  per  the  events  in  history,
current  and  international  affairs,  social  and  political  changes  or  reflecting  the
beauty of nature. In order to break the barriers of caste and religion, atheists name
their children in a secular manner, connoting a meaning relevant to the time or an
event which has no religious connotation. Taking the case of children in Atheist
Centre, Samaram (II World War), Niyanta (dictator), Lavanam (Salt, was born on the
eve of  Gandhi’s  Salt  Satyagraha),  Vijayam (Victory.  First  success  of  Congress  in
General  Elections),  Vidya  (Education)  and  the  younger  generation  with  unique
names  such  as  Sanketh  (Information),  Vidwat  (Knowledge),  Saujas  (Redoubled
Vigour  and  Youthfulness),  Saaras  &  Tejas  (Indigenous  manned  aeroplanes
developed by India), Olos (Olympics Los Angeles) to mention a few. Many atheists
are making the next generation secular and post religious. Atheists also stress on
the need for birth registration, which is neglected in India. When they admit their
children in educational institutions, in the application forms they mention in the
caste and religion column as ‘nil’ (Vijayam n.d.).
22 The  examples  provided  here  of  names  intended  to  ‘break  the  barriers  of  caste  and
religion’ are both international and national(ist) in outlook, with references to the Second
World War, the Los Angeles Olympic Games, Gandhi’s salt march and the development of
‘indigenous’ airplanes. Replacing caste and religious connotations with nationalist ones is
a well-worn integrative move—it recalls, for instance, the ‘Meri Jaati Hindustani’ (My Caste
is Indian) movement, which encourages Indians to write ‘Hindustani’ as their caste at
census time,10 and the very publicly visible use of  ‘Bharti’  and ‘Swaraj’  as nationalist
surnames.  And  as  with  Lyric  and  Sonnet,  the  pattern  of  naming  enacted  here  is
simultaneously innovative and conventional: Olos, for instance, is certainly unique, yet
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follows  the  classic  Indian  template  of  context-sensitive  (Ramanujan 1989)  naming,
wherein children are named after the day on which they were born (Itvari, Manglu etc.)
and former Bihar Chief Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav and his wife Babri ‘named their first
daughter Misa after the 1973 Maintenance of Internal Security Act that [Indira] Gandhi
used to quell  all  opposition during the Emergency’  (Cohen 2008: 36).  These,  then, are
attempts—partial  but  meaningful—at  onomastic  purification;  secular  innovations  that
nonetheless emerge from and reflect existing naming conventions.11
23 There are multiple ways in which rationalists across time and space have sought to purify
selves, spaces and events of religious iconography—in present-day England, for instance,
‘the first thing that a [Humanist] celebrant does, when he or she arrives at the chapel [to
conduct  a  funeral],  is  take away or have covered any religious symbols  that  may be
present’  (Engelke  2015a: 39)—and  the  giving  of  names  that  seek  to  avoid  religious
connotations  is  on  the  face  of  it  an  onomastic  variant  of  the  practice.  Moreover,
onomastic  purification can take many different  forms and arise  from quite  different
motivations.  Restricting  ourselves  to  South  Asia,  there  is  the  case  of  the  Viduthalai
Ciruthaigal Katchi (VCK—Liberation Panther Party)—the largest Dalit movement in Tamil
Nadu—whose  embrace  of  Tamil  nationalism  has  involved  a  mass  campaign  to  de-
Sanskritise personal names (Roberts 2010, see also Ramaswamy 1997), while Pakistan is
seeing an increasingly purist attitude towards Islamic naming, with Wahabi-influenced
moves to ban nicknames, names determined by numerology and even names ‘implying
that the prophet or saints bestow a child’ (Rahman 2013: 47). While some of this logic is
no doubt exhibited in the case of Indian rationalists who in other contexts certainly make
it their business to expunge religious symbolism, a critical difference is that in this case
purification concerns less a move toward secular or rationalist piety or virtue than a
move  towards  productive  not-knowing  and  disidentification.  Use  of  the  term
‘purification’  here  must  therefore  be  nuanced.  Unlike  the  Hindu  social  worker  in
Steinberg’s essay (this issue) who removes Azeez from the child runaway Akhil-Azeez’s
hitherto ambiguous and situationally changeable name because ‘she did not want to give
him a Muslim name,’ and schoolteachers in the Sunderbans who similarly Hinduise the
Islamic inflections of pupils’ ambiguous boundary-crossing names in class registers (Jalais
2009: 56), the strategy in this case is not one of either/or, or even both/and, but neither/
nor. Which is to say that here purification and commitment to confusion go together, with
purification not aimed at narrowing down to a singular association (such as Tamil) but at
the removal of all associations.
24 Since this is purification in the service of an ‘open’ name—open in the sense of seeking to
pre-empt the way in which a name can pre-empt identity; keeping a child’s options ‘open’
so to speak—this is indeed a very particular kind of purification. Das (this issue) refers to
the ‘open texture’ of certain names and of names ‘pregnant with future possibilities,’ and
the purified names given by rationalists similarly are an attempt to keep open a child’s
future possibilities.
25 Rationalists  sometimes  say  that  purified  surnames  such  as  No-caste  are  intended  to
provoke surprise and reflection on the part of hearers—‘to make people think’ as several
activists put it to me—so we might say that they are a species of meta-name (indirectly
pedagogical names meant to provoke reflection about the conventions of naming). It is
difficult to gauge whether this intention is often, or even ever, fulfilled, but recognition
of the intention is important in itself, and I can attest to the surprise they can generate.
But there is a problem. Activists who do not go the route of purified names do not so
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much disapprove of such names as simply point out that many of them would be listed in
Indian baby name books unambiguously under the ‘Hindu’ section.12 Consider the names
Vikas  (development),  given  since  the  boy  was  born  during  the  First  World  Atheist
Conference in 1972 which aimed to spread secular and atheist thought, and Sahasra (a
new beginning), given in connection with the Arab Spring and what seemed then to be
the burgeoning spirit of democracy in the Arab world. While they do not disclose the
person’s caste or necessarily refer to gods or Hindu concepts, their Sanskrit-derivation
means they are nonetheless strongly indicative of this tradition. Activists work toward a
function of  names correlative with Mill’s  (1843)  sense of  them as being ‘meaningless
marks set upon things [or persons] to distinguish them from one another,’ which is not to
say that the name has no lexical meaning but that ‘whatever lexical meaning it may have
had, or still retains, does not interfere with its denotative function’ (Nicolaisen 1978: 42).
The problem of  course is  that  particular communities  are frequently associated with
particular languages, whatever the lexical meanings of the words used as names, and
whether  or  not  such  an  association  has  to  some  extent  been  formed  via  indigenist
appropriation (Pollock 2011: 40).
26 However, a television advertisement shows one imagined solution to the problem, and I
conclude this section by describing it. The ad, aired in 2008, was for the Indian mobile
phone  company  Idea  Cellular,  and  featured  film  actor  Abhishek  Bachchan,  son  of
Bollywood icon Amitabh. Set in an unspecified part of rural India it depicts caste-based
strife between two fictitious village communities, the Thumihars and the Purmis. Then an
idea strikes. ‘The sarpanch [head] of the village, played by Abhishek […], declares that,
henceforth, no one will be known as a Purmi or a Thumihar. Everyone will be known by a
number. The ad goes on to show every person being known by a nine-digit number that
starts with 9 and it stops the fighting in the village as people forget their caste identities.’
13
27 Helpfully reminding us that present-day transcategorial fantasies are not the preserve of
rationalist activists, the solution the ad proposes is to move beyond words and language;
i.e. to  ‘purely’  denote  through  use  of  number.  Consider  also  the  Aadhaar  biometric
identity card scheme in which every citizen in India is assigned a 12-digit  individual
identification number to serve as proof of identity. Cohen (2012a) notes that part of the
promise of the number is precisely that it might produce de-territorialised identities free
of biography: finger prints, eye photos and indeed numbers rather than names: freedom
from identity. But of course, and for good reason, reduction to a number is usually seen as
being precisely that—an acutely negative reduction.  Prisoner tattoos in late nineteenth
century India inscribed a number made up of the prisoner’s date of conviction and a
serial number (Singha 2000), and there are of course many other notorious instances of
reductive  numeric  inscription  from  the  century  after.  De  Certeau  (2007: 162)  has
complained of the replacement of local street names—a world of folklore, stories and
legends that nurtures our collective memory—by numbers, just as ‘on the telephone, one
no longer dials Opera, but 073.’ The expunging of stories and legends by arbitrary numeric
combinations causes the city to become a ‘suspended symbolic order’ (ibid), and for de
Certeau this is to be lamented.
28 However,  if  an  onomastic  symbolic  order  upholds  a  structure  of  discrimination  and
domination,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  why activists  and those  affected might  actively
pursue  its  suspension  and  even  view  substitution  by  numbers  as  a  very  productive
reduction indeed. We need, of course, to be cautious on the question of whether number
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is in actual fact purely referential, while according recognition to others’ conceptions of
it as such. Maurer (2003: 318) usefully questions whether ‘conversion to number’ is always
and everywhere a straightforward reduction. Invoking Wittgenstein, Maurer notes ways
in which numbers may take on rhetorical functions, especially in respect of their putative
‘reduction’  to  equivalence  (Maurer  2003: 319).  Similarly,  if  we  consider  number’s
reduction to equivalence a ‘form of argument’ (Maurer 2003: 319)—part of the fantasy
work of  money,  in  Maurer’s  analysis—then we might  understand nominative uses  of
number  (i.e. numbers  as  names)  as  a  means  of  producing  equivalence  of  identities:  a
veritable ‘fraternization of impossibilities’ (Marx 1977: 110), but here positively valued.
Numeric  equivalence  in  names,  as  in  money,  seems  to  contain  the  possibility  of
‘rendering dissimilars into species of the same’ (Maurer 2003: 332). In other words, it is
precisely the connotative power of number (its rendering equivalent) that allows it to be
mobilised as a fantasy of pure denotation.
 
Strategy 2
29 We now turn from number  as  name to  number  of names,  and the  multiplication of
associations consequent on the strategy of boundary crossing. If rationalists’ strategy of
onomastic purification possesses a logic of neither/nor, or disidentification, the logic of
the strategy of boundary-crossing names is that of both/and, or multiplied identification.
Both strategies  aim for  a  kind of  categorial  undecideability  (Derrida  1988: 116),  with
activists seeking to denature (or problematise) conventional classifications in accordance
with their ideal of human flourishing beyond categories. But as we shall see, the second
strategy, like the first, raises several problems.
30 While many Christian-origin rationalists belong to secular and rationalist organisations
in the  south and Muslim-origin activists  have  been central  in  the  twentieth-century
history  of  the  rationalist  movement,  most  activists  I  met  were  from Hindu  or  Sikh
backgrounds,  and it  was notable how many of them gave their children recognisably
Islamic names. Medical doctor Narendra Dabholkar, the founder of the main rationalist
society  in  Maharashtra  and  staunch  secular  campaigner  whose  murder  in  2013  was
internationally reported, gave his son the Islamic name Hamid—probably in honour of
Hamid Dalwai, who in 1977 founded the Indian Secular Society (Quack 2012b: 101). Of a
saraswat Brahmin background,  Narendra Dabholkar  had already replaced his  original
caste title surname with one indicating his place of origin. His son’s name, then, was
doubly transcategorial.  Dabholkar’s fellow Maharashtrian rationalist  and Marathi film
actor Shriram Lagoo gave his son the Islamic name Tanveer, while Kalanathan, a Keralan
activist, and his wife, named their son Shameel. As Kalanathan put it to me, ‘I was born as
a Hindu but I am not a Hindu—I am a human. I want to make a confusion so they can’t
identify a person’s religion by their name. Only then will it go away. I say to [my son], use
both names—[Hindu] Kalanathan as well as [Islamic] Shameel.14 Then no-one will know
what you are, everyone will be confused.’
31 As was noted above, there are places, times and communities in which boundary-crossing
names are quite conventional and do not form statements of secularism or participate in
a  project  to  problematise  conventional  categories.  The  intentional  hybridity
(Marsland 2007) of the secular boundary-crossing name is consequent on prior deeds of
purification  that  constitute  this  brand of  secular  naming  as  the  act  of  bringing  the
separated  categories  into  relation  (see  Maurer 2003).  My  sense,  from travelling  with
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activists from town to town in Bihar, Karnataka and Maharashtra on science education
campaigns, is that boundary-crossing names have a higher capacity than purified names
to surprise  those who encounter  them.  In this  recombinatory onomastics  surprise  is
produced  through  unexpected  juxtaposition.  If  surprise  is  often  an  occasion  for
generating new concepts  (Street  & Copeman 2014: 13,  18),  here it  is  a  technique for
disrupting older ones. In this sense, the capacity of boundary-crossing names to enact a
‘pedagogy of the name’ is more pronounced than those characteristic of strategy 1. In
part this is because rationalists share the latter strategy with many non-rationalists who
practice  it  for  other  (most  commonly  caste-obviating)  reasons,  whereas  boundary-
crossing  names  are  more  particular  to  rationalists.  Similarly,  though  a  significant
minority of activists has adopted boundary-crossing names for either themselves or their
children, such names are not as frequently used as purified ones.
32 Though the logics informing them overlap, there are obvious tensions between the two
strategies  considered  thus  far.  In  particular,  purifiers  may  be  disparaging  about  the
boundary-crossing strategy of naming in such a way that retains religious connotations.
As one Punjabi activist put it to me, ‘Changing one religious name to another religious
name is not a solution to the problem.’ Such naming practices might produce helpful
confusion but they do not move one away from ‘religion’ per se. The purifiers, as we
know,  seek  out  names  without  religious  connotations,  though boundary-crossers  are
quick to point out that they rarely achieve this. Sahasra, as we have seen, may not refer
explicitly to a religious concept, but is categorised as a Hindu name in Indian baby name
guides.  The two strategies  seem to reflect  a  tension between varieties  of  secularism:
Purified  names  seem  to  reflect  onomastically  the  separatist  agenda  of  rationalist
umbrella  organization the  Federation of  Indian Rationalist  Associations  (FIRA)  which
campaigns on a national level for a stricter separation between state and religion. On the
other hand, boundary-crossing names would seem to reflect the ‘other’ secularism—the
accommodative,  liberal  pluralist  one still  widely viewed as having its roots in ‘Hindu
tolerance’ (see Smith 1963) and whose three salient principles have been described as:
‘religious freedom, celebratory neutrality and reformatory justice’ (Dhavan 1999: 48).
33 Indeed, the two strategies do, I think, reflect wider tensions in the interpretation and
implementation of ‘secularism’ both within and outside the rationalist fold. But for such a
claim to be satisfactory it requires qualification. An analytic of ‘reflection’ does not do
justice to the intentions of namers for the names they give to produce effects in the
world.  The  transcategorialism  of  secular  names  is  meant  to  transform  the  world
(dethrone the algorithm) rather than simply reflect abstract rival doctrines of political
thought. Such names do represent two key ways of conceptualizing secularism, but they
are also acts of definition in Holbraad’s (2012: xxiii) sense.
34 Such a sense of the capacity of names to produce effects in the world marks the act of
naming as the staging of an intervention. Rationalist uses of boundary-crossing names
define a  space where the rather abstract  political  precepts  of  accommodative liberal
pluralism meet the everyday intimacy of domestic usage, in which a name’s repetition
seems  at  once  to  dilute  and  concentrate  its  associations,  which  is  to  say  that  such
repetition  makes  those  associations  ordinary  (at  least  according  to  the  namer’s
intentions). Naming, in such instances, can arise from an intention of making a relation to
the other ordinary, or be informed by reflection on ‘the notion of the possibility of being
in the place where the Other is’ (Duranti 2010: 16). So again, secular names do not simply
reflect  an  ideology  but  are  designed  to  iteratively  produce  a  particular  kind  of
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intersubjective sensibility. Consider the case described by Banerjee (2008: iv) of Hindu
parents giving their child an Islamic name. Informing the parents’ decision was a desire
to  force  themselves  to  use  these  names  with  love  rather  than  with  hate.  Having
themselves been profoundly affected by communal violence,  the parents named their
child  in  a  way  that  served  as  a  prophylactic  against  the  lure  of  othering.  Here  the
pedagogy of the name is directed as much at the name-giver as a reminder (an onomastic
‘note to self’) as it is to strangers, and differs from the meta-name in operating through
repetition rather than through calling attention to itself as a name (though boundary-
crossing names can do this, too, as we have seen). The Hindu-background activists I know
who have given Islamic or Christian names to their children, which perforce are subject
to continual repetition, did so as a kind of secular technology of the self to avoid othering
a community that their political opponents have no compunction about de-humanizing
and as recognition of its temptation. As one activist put it to me, ‘Everyday and many
times I say it. The [Islamic] name reminds us [the child’s parents]: we should not follow
the media and others and scapegoat this community for votes; we’re all Indians.’
35 It  is important and necessary to recognise parents’  intentions here,  and the nuanced
reflections that inform their acts of naming. But what are the effects of such names?
What kind of responses do such names engender? Given the Hindu provenance of most
activists,  one  could  make  a  case  that  boundary-crossing  names  operate  (ironically)
through a classical  Hindu mode of  laying claim to,  and incorporating,  otherness.  We
might ask: what makes the other available for incorporation in this way? What sorts of
power relations inhere? Are Muslims in a position to object? I do not mean to imply that
they  would  object  if  only  given  the  chance  but  it  is  nevertheless  important  to
acknowledge the structure of possibilities here. Hindus may happily go to a church and
light candles (and this may be seen as a testament to the greatness and inclusiveness of
Hinduism). But such inclusiveness also constructs religion as such in a certain way, one
that may be just as dogmatic and imperial as more exclusive forms of worship.15 Are
syncretic names, then, ‘code word[s] for the incorporation and assimilation of “minority”
cultures into the culture of the dominant group’ (Viswanathan 1995: 21)? We need to both
take seriously activists’ professed aims in employing such names—which as we have seen,
primarily concern the desirability of confusion and dis-identity and of making a relation
to the other ordinary—and thereby avoid reducing this onomastics to the status of mere
symptom of a Hindu rationalism (which would be to dismiss activists’ own sense of their
actions and typify what Engelke [2015b] calls a ‘gotcha’ argument), and pay heed to the
possibility that this is how others may perceive such usages and to the recognition that
certain kinds of (not necessarily rationalist) boundary-crossing name may indeed form
part  of  the  semiotics  of  an  imposed  ‘order  of  unity’  (Viswanathan  1995).  Certainly,
boundary-crossing  names  are  markedly  differentiated.  Consider,  for  instance,  the
multiple  associations  of  the  name of  contemporary north Indian guru Gurmeet  Ram
Rahim Singh Ji Insan—this, I suggest, is a name that enfolds; being suggestive both of the
bhakti universalism his movement espouses and of the guru as embodied confluence (Das
2014a) of different religious traditions. Accusations of appropriation do form a response
to the rationalist boundary-crossing name, as we shall see; however, their source is not
the community that at first glance we might consider the subject of appropriation, but
the Hindu right.
36 It  is  not  a  straightforward  matter  to  discern  how  ‘everyday  Muslims’—as  if  such  a
category were stable and meaningful across a range of disparate situations, regions and
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discourses  (Cohen 2012b: 101)—view such uses  of  ‘their’  names  by  Hindu-background
rationalists. The Muslim-background rationalists I know either shrug or applaud, which is
unsurprising  given  their  affiliation  with  the  movement.  A  few  themselves  possess
boundary-crossing names (which, notably, in several cases include a Christian first name
and  ‘Singh’—a  generic,  but  with  Rajput  and/or  Sikh  connotations).  In  the  limited
instances in which I have been able to observe Muslim-strangers’ first encounters with
rationalist boundary-crossing names—for instance, when signing in at a guesthouse or in
conversation in a train carriage—a certain puzzlement and/or suspicion that that name is
false resulted. In one case, in a busy carriage on Mumbai’s Central Line, on learning the
name of the activist I was accompanying the Muslim passenger politely enquired about
the  rationalist’s  parents:  had  they  belonged  to  the  nationalist  movement?  (Freedom
fighter Udham Singh’s boundary-crossing name was referred to above, but consider also
the  great  Bengali  literary  icon,  Kazi  Nazrul  Islam,  whose  patriotic  songs  and poems
advocated  communal  harmony.  His  children’s  names—Krishna  Mohammad,  Arindam
Khaled,  Kazi Sabyasachi and Kazi Aniruddha—were a tapestry of Arabic and Sanskrit,
Hindu and Islamic connotations).
 
Inter-marriage/inter-name
37 Another common response upon hearing a boundary-crossing name, from Muslims and
non-Muslims alike, is to enquire—and the level of discretion here varies widely!—as to
whether the bearer’s parents had a love-match (i.e. an inter-religious marriage). Mines
(1998: 238) has noted that the offspring of inter-faith marriages in Tamil Nadu frequently
bear  boundary-crossing names reflecting the different  religious  backgrounds of  their
parents. This is also witnessed in the names borne by the children of Bollywood icon
Shahrukh and Gauri Khan (see epigraph). This is an interesting case for several reasons:
like the names of other offspring of ‘love-matches’ the names Aryan and Suhana Khan
bear a trace of the ‘modernist’ conjugal production of the child as the joint achievement
of  both  parents  in  which  they  see  ‘novel  combinations  of  themselves’  and  an
objectification of  their  love (Strathern 1992: 55,  78),  coded onomastically  here in the
‘nextness’ of names that indicate their different religious backgrounds: ‘We are a Hindu-
Muslim family,’ Shahrukh Khan notes. But he also calls attention to the ‘secularism’ of the
name of his most recent child: ‘I liked the connotation that [AbRam’s]…a secular name.’
This points towards the common understanding that all inter-faith marriages are to some
degree ‘secular’  in signifying an ability to transcend conventional  divisions,  and it  is
worth noting here that most Indian rationalist organisations claim to offer financial and
legal support to couples who have performed them in the face of familial opposition. The
offers  of  assistance  made  by  rationalist  groups  show  their  sympathy  for  inter-faith
marriages, but of course the majority of such marriages do not arise from anything so
grand as  an ideological  position on secularism taken up by  the  couple.  Though less
widespread than it  once  was,  some incoming brides  in  north India  change (or  have
changed for them) their forename as well as surname to mark their new circumstances.
Inter-faith or -caste marriages, too, may occasion the bride changing her name to efface
the boundary crossing the relationship embodied in a kind of post-hoc imposition of
propriety.  In  light  of  this,  we come to  apprehend the  critical  role  of  the  boundary-
crossing name: a child’s inter-name, in making the inter-marriage explicit, retroactively
causes  the  inter-marriage  to  form a  secular  statement.  The inter-name of  the  ‘love-
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match,’  then,  may be indicative of secularism in a lower key,  and rationalists indeed
encounter inter-faith marriages as a form of lived secularism. If and when couples, too,
come to understand their own conjugal trajectories in such a way, their children’s names
may signify both the complex unity of their ‘separate’ identities within the child and a
kind of statement that reflects back on the ‘secularism’ of the union it emerges from.
38 Shahrukh Khan is himself extremely cognisant of the capacity of personal names to effect
automatic categorisation. A recent film of his on the racial profiling of Muslims after the
9/11 attacks on New York foregrounded the highly suggestive statement, ‘My name is
Khan and I am not a terrorist,’ and at an airport in New York to promote the same film,
right on cue, the star was detained for questioning for two hours ‘because his name came
up on a computer alert list.’16 ‘“I was really hassled—perhaps because of my name being
Khan,” he said in a text message to reporters in India. “These guys just wouldn’t let me
through.”’17 This episode, and the detentions that he (like so many others with Islamic
names) has been subjected to before and since, adds poignancy to the name he and Gauri
Khan gave to their most recent child: AbRam. A particularly innovative ‘intername’ in the
way it crosses boundaries within the forename itself, and also remarkable for the public
debate it generated, I want to dwell for a moment on the way in which it mobilises the
figure of Abraham in reference to a Hindu god. A report titled ‘Secularism Shows in the
Name of “AbRam,”’18 quotes the actor: ‘“As we all know my wife Gauri is from Hindu
family and me Muslim, by this so many issues arose but we are far from those issues now.
We decided that our baby’s name should show secularism so we have decided to give the
name  to  [our]  new-born  baby  “AbRam”.  Here  “Ab”  stands  for  our  Prophet  “Huzoor
Abraham Alai-His-Salam” and “Ram” stands for as we all know Bhagwan “Ram.”’
39 Abraham is of course a kind of go-to figure of promise for progressive faith commentators
for whom, as the root of the Abrahamic faiths, he stands for the possibility of healing and
accord between the religions he ‘fathered.’ For Derrida (2007: 1–2), the ‘serial multiplicity
of the “more than one [plus d’un]” inscribed itself upon the very name of Abraham,’ and it
is in meditating upon the iconic progenitor’s name that he produces an analytic of ‘fidélité
à plus d’un [faithfulness to more than one or: collective faithfulness]’ (Derrida 2007: 14)
and of what I interpret as names that may afford hospitality. One can see the attraction
for Derrida of a figure that seems quite in tune with his own ‘reasoned distrust toward
borders and oppositional  distinctions (whether conceptual  or not)’  (Derrida 2007: 17).
Indeed, Abraham is equated by Derrida with ‘the endurance of the undecideable’ (Derrida
2007: 17), just as the focus here has been on an onomastics of undecideability as a counter
to automatic categorisation, and a hospitality extended to ‘the other in me.’ AbRam is, of
course, just such an undecideable, even hospitable, name. Its audacity lies in onomastic
extension of the lineage, with the ‘Ab’ brought together with ‘Ram,’ the name of a Hindu




40 Mines (1998: 238) noted how children of inter-faith marriages bearing boundary-crossing
names were teased by schoolteachers who ‘both disapproved [of] and were titillated by
[their parents’] union,’ and activists’ children bearing this kind of name can be met with
similar  responses.  Such  names  might  be  given  with  worthy  transcategorial  and/or
pedagogical  intentions,  but  cause  those  who  perforce  bear  them  some  misery  and
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embarrassment. Dabholkar’s son Hamid is said to have ‘suffered a lot in college because of
his name. Everyone asked him, “What is your caste? What is your caste?”’19 While in the
case referred to above in which avowedly secular parents gave a Hindu boy an Islamic
name, the child later demanded to be given a new, unambiguously Hindu name due to
teasing at school (Banerjee 2008). If the illocutionary force of naming acts is ‘felicitous
[only] when the context is in place and our trust in conventions is secure’ (Das 2007: 178),
the  absence  of  these  factors  in  respect  of  unconventional,  or  extraordinary,  acts  of
naming such as  these disrupts  their  efficacy.  The boundary-crossing name is  in part
interventionist—intended to eventuate the disidentity it embodies—but also normative in
depicting  what  transcategorialism  ideally  should  be  like  (and  as  such  at  odds  with
ordinary  naming  conventions).  But  similar  to  philosophical  writings  that  create  a
normative base for discussing what various phenomena ideally should be like, with often
little attempt to account for their everyday forms (Miller 2007: 546), boundary-crossing
names will sometimes not fare well within the scenes of utterance into which they are
inserted. In addition to the teasing of those who bear them, there is the even blunter
instrument of simply refusing to use such names. A Kolkata-based, Hindu-background
activist  described to me how her non-rationalist  family members20 do exactly this in
respect of her daughter: that is, they ignore the Islamic name given to her by her parents,
having between them—and quite independently of her parents—decided on a Hindu name
for her that they would use. The activist is fearful that they may even have consulted a
pandit for the purpose. Since making something the case by representing or declaring it
as such only succeeds if the status of the actor performing the function is to some degree
collectively recognised (Searle 2010: 7), one can see why rationalist acts of naming may
fail to ‘take’ in families in which the tradition is to consult a pandit rather than leave the
act of naming solely with the parents.
41 Refusals to acknowledge and/or scorning of boundary-crossing names thus form one of
the major problems generated by rationalists’ attempts to realign the problem of names
and automatic  categorisation.  But  the  problems  they face  are  not  discrete  and  may
overlap, which is what we find in the next illustrative example which concerns the name
of the aforementioned film actor Shriram Lagoo.
 
Paradoxical appropriation
42 In the early 2000s, the actor-activist ‘was harassed by the hooligans of [the] RSS who
insisted that he should change his first name because Shriram is God’s name [but] he is an
atheist.’21 The origins of the controversy lie in Lagoo having written a piece called ‘Retire
the god’ that served as the introduction to a new book on the noted Keralan/Sri Lankan
rationalist Abraham Kavoor.22 It went further than Dabholkar’s organisation was itself
willing to go, at least publicly, on the question of the existence of God and the article
inspired considerable public debate. Dabholkar and Lagoo then began a program they
named  Vivek  Jagar  (Knowledge  Awakening)  in  which  they  staged  debates  across
Maharashtra. Dabholkar (2001: 10) reports details of a specific confrontation between the
actor and Hindu right activists that occurred immediately after a Vivek Jagar program at
Sangli:
Dr. Lagoo wanted to go to Mumbai by night train. We, all the organizers, were at
station to see him off. The train was late. During that period we saw a group of
young people rushing towards Dr. Lagoo. At first we thought that the group may be
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fans of Doctor who also is a famous film actor… Within no time they surrounded us
and started shouting slogans like Jai [i.e. victory to] Bhavani, Jai Shivaji; Sanatan
Hindu Dharm ki Jai… They started asking questions like, Why do you speak against
Hindu religion?… One of them suggested that Dr. Lagoo should shout Jai Shri Ram.
Dr. Lagoo was not afraid at all. He must have thought himself and with a smile on
his face he said ‘Jai  Shri Ram’ and after a pause added ‘Lagoo’ to it.  The slogan
became ‘Jai Shri Ram Lagoo.’ Even in those strenuous moments we could not help
laughing.  All  these  angry young men were  confused.  At  that  moment  the  train
entered the platform and Dr. Lagoo boarded the train. Thus further confrontation
was avoided.
43 Lagoo’s forename Shriram presents a paradox, since his use of it is at odds with both of
the strategies we have considered:  neither purified nor boundary-crossing,  the name
Shriram Lagoo unambiguously encodes its  bearer’s  Hindu background.  No change,  or
renaming, has taken place to cause offence—it is his continued use of the name that
seems to be the problem. (Indeed, as the foregoing examples indicate, the objects of the
majority  of  rationalists’  naming  innovations  are  their  children,  as  with  Lagoo’s  son
Tanveer). If his own name became a matter of concern due to his very public atheism,
part of Lagoo’s rationale for preserving it is sentimental:  ‘As a child I…was not [in] a
position to oppose my parents not  to give God’s  name to me.  They were very pious
parents and as such they might have chosen the God’s name for their beloved child. They
have given me name with their love and affection’ (cited in Dabholkar 2001: 10). There are
also practical concerns: ‘Atheists do not like to be called by God’s name, [but] there is no
simple and easy escape route for them,’ one activist told me.23 Another stated: ‘More than
10 million people have gods in their names. Some are Bhagwan or Paramatma Singh, even
Ram—there are so many. But I have not chosen my name. My parents gave me my name. I
became a rationalist later on in life. So how can I change it?’
44 The Hindu right activists who threatened Lagoo, however, apparently consider his mere
continuing to bear a name that he did not choose for himself an active appropriation of it.
From  such  an  angle,  his  name  may  indeed  be  construed  as  boundary  crossing:  a
rationalist,  he nonetheless  bears a  notably Hindu name.  Lévi-Strauss (1966)  famously
noted how ‘Some societies jealously watch over their names,’ and countless ethnographic
examples could be given that show how names are frequently understood as items of
property. Part of the problem, of course, is that Shriram is not just a Hindu-identifying
name but a god’s name—and one that the Hindu right has expended a large amount of
energy  defending  in  recent  decades.  Moreover,  in  certain  bhakti schools  there  is
considerable slippage between the name and deity, with mantras inseparable from the
gods  whose  names  they speak (Wilke  and Moebus  2011: 571).  So  as  with the  lesbian
character Sita in the film Fire (1998) whose name was changed to Nita in response to
violent Hindu right protests, ‘defence’ of the name seems to constitute defence of the god
him or herself. If ‘stories told about objects of use belong to their aura’ (Das 2014b: 294),
we might say that in seeking to hinder the attachment of Lagoo’s rationalist crusading to
the  name object  he  carries  Hindu activists  seek  copyright  protection of  the  (Hindu)
name’s  aura.  They  are  seeking  to  manage  (and  contain)  the  name’s  associations—a
delimiting  that  mirrors  rationalist  activists’  own  attempts  to  generate  expulsive  or
purified names.
45 Notwithstanding  Jaffrelot’s  (2008)  powerful  argument  concerning  the  learned,  or
instrumental, nature of Hindutva’s ‘taking offence,’ it is possible to perceive why a person
with the name Shriram proclaiming the need to ‘retire the god’ might be construed as
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incongruous for some. Of course, as with brand names (Mazzarella, this issue), accruing
improper associations is a risk built into the very existence of personal names. Just as
‘brand  jacking’  demonstrates  that  a  product  is  ‘never  able  to  legislate  its  own
intelligibility completely’ (Nakassis 2013: 121), intentionally incongruous name uses can
be taken up as a form of political assertion. Consider the case of controversial right-wing
Slovenian politician and former prime minister, Janez Janša, whose statement in 2007
that ‘the more there will be of us [i.e. Slovenians as opposed to immigrants] the sooner we
shall  reach  the  goal’  was  responded  to  with  ironic  literalism when  three  Slovenian
performance artists legally renamed themselves Janez Janša. The act of naming doubly
performative (in Austin’s and in the artistic sense), the artists’ subsequent engagement in
activities incongruous with the names they bore constituted an indirect but potent form
of political critique; for example, a headline ‘Janez Janša Dances in Berlin,’ which referred
to an artistic performance by one of the three artists, had a double-meaning, since it
could be interpreted as the Prime Minister being servile to German interests (Janša et al.
 2008).24
46 I do not claim that such a logic animated Lagoo’s retention of the name Shriram—no
renaming took place, and his name is a matter of concern for Hindutva activists, not him.
Yet the episode at the station in Sangli in which the actor-activist proclaimed ‘Jai Shri
Ram…Lagoo’ certainly seemed to play on the gap between name and named and was
evidently comical for Dabholkar and his colleagues.25 In his analysis of Bentham’s ‘auto-
icon’—the  philosopher’s  bequeathal  of  his  own  stuffed  corpse  to  University  College,
London in 1832—Collings (2000: 124) sees in the gesture a ‘delicious profanation’ and ‘a
kind of sly joke against contemporary prejudice and outraged opinion’ that calls upon
‘the  libidinal  resources  of  debasement  and  traditional  inversion  rituals.’  Is  there
something of this wilful transgression and inversion of convention in some rationalist
acts of naming? Many activists take delight in staging their weddings on inauspicious
days, feasting during eclipses, and consuming substances such as meat and alcohol that in
many contexts are shunned as impure. The hinted at sense of wilful transgression—not
frequently present, but perhaps animating the laughter at Sangli station—is suggestive of
pleasurable  incongruity,  and of  taking  possession  for  ironic  effect  in  a  manner  that
contains parallels with the case of Janez Janša. Rather than brand jacking, it could be




47 This paper has sought to shed light on secular naming innovations through identifying
and exploring two key strategies used by rationalist activists to deactivate the automatic
categorisation  of  the  name,  and  their  problems.  The  two  onomastic  strategies—of
purification on the one hand and boundary crossing on the other—aim to achieve similar
ends, but pursue different means. The focus on their problems has not been because I
view the  strategies  as  flawed or  the  deeply  held  convictions  informing them as  not
significant, but because it affords illumination of the differentiated nature and differently
weighted priorities of Indian rationalist  and secular campaigning,  and the manner in
which problem-solving can beget new kinds of problems. I conclude by pointing to a final
way in which some secular names have been considered to be problematic.
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48 ‘We Indians love the renaming concept…’ This wearily sardonic remark may be found in
the comments section below an online newspaper report on the efforts of an NGO in
Maharashtra to rename en masse the hundreds of girls in the state who had reportedly
been named by their parents Nakusa (unwanted).26 The remark takes its place in a long
line of commentary—from colonial times (Cohn 1996: 125), through to the mid twentieth-
century (Naipaul 1964) and beyond—that has sought to diagnose an Indian susceptibility
to show and drama and preference for symbolic action over that which is substantive and
effectual. The comment suggests that little will change for these rural girls as a result of
their renaming: if they were unwanted before, they will likely remain so after. Similarly,
when it was reported that thousands of Pakistani children were unable to access a state
welfare scheme due to unknown parentage, and former president Asif Ali Zardari had
offered them his own name for use in the otherwise empty father’s name box, online
commenters ridiculed the gesture: ‘Can the children object?’ ‘Haven’t the kids suffered
enough?’ ‘He is screwing the whole country […] he might as well lend his name to some of
the children of the country that don’t have names already.’ It was ridiculed, in other
words, because what these children really needed was not offered, only that which could
be given without  the  giver  giving anything up:  ‘If  his  “kids”  can get  a  share  of  his
property, then why not?’ ‘Is it only name, or education and other facilities same as his
own children’s […] Surely he can afford it.’27
49 This begs the question of the kind of adjacency, or hospitality, that a boundary-crossing
name does and does not embody. Are they empty gestures? Does the adjacency figured in
such a name pay ‘attention to the concrete specificity of the other’ (Das 2010: 377), or is
the other more of an abstract, theoretical presence? I think here of the middle class blood
donors I  met and discussed in previous work (Copeman 2009: 170) who declaim their
progressive  credentials  in  imagining  their  donated  blood  being  transfused  into,  and
merging with,  the bodies of any others.  Meanwhile,  they do not inter-dine,  and have
extremely little day-to-day contact with people belonging to communities other than
their own. Rather than a concrete and complicated presence, the other is considered
abstractly in absentia.  Boundary-crossing names—certainly those that do not originate
from within inter-faith marriages—may reflect something of this sensibility, but I would
wish to be cautious on this point. A good number of activists do indeed marry across
religious boundaries, while we have seen that boundary-crossing names are often given
with an intention of making a relation to the other ordinary. I do not claim that a family’s
endlessly repeated iteration of the name of the other as the name of its own is the same
thing as participation in everyday networks of encounter, but that such an onomastics of
recognition and non-recognition is worthy of our attention for its complex intertwining
of the ordinary (enacted through a name’s everyday iteration) and the attempt to aspire
to a ‘higher ideal’ through systematic disruption of an onomastic order in which a name
unproblematically defines its bearer.
50 Connected to this is the matter of caste names.  ‘The nationalist project,’  writes Rege
(2006: 31), ‘mobilised modernity and [the] nation to make the public expression of caste
illegitimate. As caste became the “other” of the modern, the modern secular Indian came
to be imagined as one who publicly and politically disavowed caste.’28 And arguably the
simplest way to do this is to drop the caste surname. Many examples could be offered:
consider how on many Indian campuses it is politically correct for students to substitute
caste  surnames  with  generics,  and  also  very  recent  headlines  that  have  focused  on
popular novelist Amish’s decision to drop his caste surname, and the Himachal Pradesh
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police force decree that all its officers must do the same, and so on.29 In the light of
analyses that view such onomastic moves as part of an urban middle class strategy to stop
caste  coming  into  the  public  sphere  and  thereby  having  to  negotiate  over  its  own
position, the question again arises as to whether purified names partake of what Dirks
(2001) calls ‘the embarrassment of caste’—public denial of its significance (figured here by
the  absence  of  a  caste  surname)  going  hand  in  hand  in  the  domestic  sphere  with
persistence of caste-based marriages, and a multitude of other caste logics. Do rationalist
onomastics enact a comparable covering over of the matter, a self-serving ‘abolition by
denial’  (Chatterjee 2005)  such  that  structures  of  discrimination  are  left  in  place  but
simply no longer talked about (named)?
51 The arguments of Rege (2006), Deshpande (2013) and Dirks (2001) are I think applicable to
very  many  of  the  onomastic  purifications  engaged  in  by  putatively  secular-aligned
individuals and organisations. But, again, we must be careful.  Consider the criticisms,
mentioned earlier, directed at campaigner-author Arundhati Roy in the wake of her new
introduction to The Annihilation of Caste. Damned if she does and damned if she doesn’t,
she is criticised for retaining a caste surname; yet if she were to drop it she would likely
be excoriated for covering it over—abolition by denial! People can have reasons for not
naming caste other than self-serving ones arising from bad faith. In the case of rationalist
activists, there are several reasons why their actions are not continuous with the middle
class (and upper caste) strategy of stopping caste coming into public view. First, there is
the pedagogy of the name that renders it an explicit object of reflection; second, their
reaching, via the name, towards categorial undecideability is explicitly a means to combat
automatic categorisation and the manifold forms of discrimination consequent on this
and an attempt to reclaim an ‘open texture’ of the name so that it does not pre-empt a
child’s identity; and third, at its most ambitious it is a project of unravelling the knot of
caste: rather than passively wait for people to forget the connotations of caste names,
they  enact  a  generative  anti-mnemonics,  or  what  might  be  described  as  a  negative
illocutionary force produced through a form of speech act that seeks to undo things with
words.
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NOTES
1. In parts of north India they do in fact signify a caste identity. In metropolitan cities, however,
they are unlikely to.
2. This research commenced in 2009 when I spent several months shadowing activists as they
travelled  through  rural  Bihar  and  Karnataka  conducting  science  education  and  miracle
debunking programmes, and is on-going. Since then I have visited rationalist associations and
events in Punjab, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, and the research
has included attendance at  one-off  events (such as state-  and national-level  conferences and
specific campaigns or protests) and regular participation in local networks (e.g. attendance of
weekly meetings of a humanist society in Delhi). As with rationalist organizations globally, there
is  an  unequal  representation  of  the  sexes  in  the  Indian  movement.  Roughly,  active  women
constitute less than a quarter of the group’s membership. The caste make-up of activists is quite
diverse, but the movement’s leaders tend to hail from upper-caste and -class backgrounds. 
3. The phrasing here borrows from Latour (2005). 
4. Transcategoriality  is  a  term  I  borrow  from  theologian  Hick  (2000)  who  proposes  it  as  a
substitute for ‘ineffable’, which for a number of reasons he sees as no longer being analytically
useful.
5. Though arguably an act of ‘Rajputisation.’
6. Though this status is regionally variable: it is a caste title/surname in parts of Uttar Pradesh. 
7. To be explored in future work. 
8. Interview, July 2013. 
9. Further details on which may be found in Quack (2012a, 2012b: 89-91). 
10. See Economic Times, 15 May 2010, and Deshpande’s (2013) telling analysis. 
11. Numerous further examples of names given after incidents co-occurring with the birth of the
child are detailed by Sharma (2005: 111-112): e.g. a child named Tito after a state visit by the
former Yugoslav statesman;  another,  born mid-air,  named Akash (sky/space);  a  child  named
Missile Singh after his parents heard explosions caused by a fire at a makeshift  ammunition
depot near their home in Bikaner.
12. Indeed, ‘Sahasra’ is categorized as a Hindu name on the indiaparenting.com website. 
13. India Today, 16 Nov. 2008.
14. This refers to the prevalent south Indian practice of using one’s father’s name as a surname. 
15. I am indebted to Nathaniel Roberts for insisting I consider this matter.
16. Telegraph. 17 Aug. 2009. 
17. Washington Post, 16 Aug. 2009.
18. http://bollybol.com/news/secularism-shows-in-the-name-of-abram-shah-rukh-khan/
19. Interview with Prabhakar Nanawaty, June 11 2013. 
20. See Quack (2012a) on tensions within the families of activists whose relatives do not share
their convictions. 
21. Interview with Prabhakar Nanawaty, June 11 2013. 
22. On whom see Quack (2012: 96-7).
23. Interview with Prabhakar Nanawaty, June 11 2013. 
24. I am grateful to Matjaz Vidmar for drawing this case to my attention. 
25. Delight in inappropriateness is certainly a feature of Indian rationalist humour, and extends
to names. After large-scale corruption at the Andhra Pradesh-based IT-firm Satyam was revealed
in 2009 much was made of the onomastic and other alleged telling connections between the firm
and the now-deceased guru Satya Sai Saba, while the astrologer Satya Devatra, the ‘Oracle of
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Gopur’, was rechristened Asatya (Untruth/Lie) Devatra after his oracular claims were exposed as
‘absolute nonsense.’
26. Wall Street Journal, 20 Oct. 2011. 
27. The Nation, 15 June 2011.
28. Deshpande’s  (2013)  important  work  on  castelessness is  also  extremely  relevant  here,
especially in underlining key differences between nationalist obviations of caste and post-Mandal
recodings  of  such  moves:  ‘Now,  the  claim  to  be  casteless  is  itself  a  sign—it  is  instantly
recognisable  as  the  unmistakable  mark  of  upper-caste  identity,  because  the  experience  of
apparent castelessness has been available only to the upper castes’ (Deshpande 2010).
29. Outlook, 31 Oct. 2011. The police order encountered its own problems: ‘policemen are finding
it  difficult  to  adhere  to  the  DGP’s  “new name mantra”  as  they  have  become habitual  using
surnames like “Minhas sahib, Thakur sahib, Sharmaji and Khan sahib” while referring to their
bosses or subordinates. They will now have to change their nameplates, badges that bear their
names, that too at a time when the Centre is conducting a caste-based census’ (The Tribune, 8 July
2011).
ABSTRACTS
This essay takes up social and political questions of naming that are often ignored in studies of
inequality or exclusion. What if South Asian personal names ceased to reveal demographic ‘data’
about their bearers, scrambling any attempt at automatic categorization? The focus here is on
naming and/or renaming for ideological reasons, and in such ways that the identity of the bearer
is  deliberately  blurred.  Grounded  in  ethnographic  work  amongst  committed  proponents  of
secularism in India (principally rationalist, humanist, and atheist activists), the essay identifies
two main strategies that activists use for the production of ‘disidentification’: purification of the
caste and religious connotations of names, and multiplication of those connotations in the giving
of boundary-crossing names. Common to each is a rationale that seeks to break the association
between name and pigeonholed identity. However, acts of renaming, and non-normative names
as such, can be and are contested. Thus, in order to clarify what is at stake in the domain of
secular naming practices the essay also focuses on debates and criticisms from both within and
outside it.
INDEX
Keywords: names, India, South Asia, secularism, atheism, caste, activism, meta-names
AUTHOR
JACOB COPEMAN
School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh
Secularism’s Names: Commitment to Confusion and the Pedagogy of the Name
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 12 | 2015
26
